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Abstract 
Standard theoretical models would predict that a currency depreciation generates an increase in net 
exports. However, recent emerging market crises, accompanied by sharp exchange rate devaluation, 
have often been followed by a fall in or a stagnation of exports. This paper provides a simple 
theoretical framework which shows that a currency crisis affects trade through (i) a competitiveness 
effect, i.e. a variation in relative prices, that positively influences the intensive margin of trade (the 
amount of exports by firms); (ii) a balance-sheet effect, i.e. a modification of the fixed cost of exports, 
which negatively affects the extensive margin of trade (the number of exporters). We derive from our 
model a gravity-like equation of bilateral sectoral trade which we estimate using data on 27 industries 
and 32 countries over the period 1976-2002. First, we find that these events have a long-lasting 
negative impact on exports - which remain below their natural level for five years. We present 
evidence suggesting that this persistent effect is due to the combination of firms' foreign currency 
borrowing and fixed costs of exports, which leads to important balance-sheet problems in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Second, the net effect of crises on exports largely depends on country 
specialization: the positive competitiveness effect is magnified by a specialization in high elasticity of 
substitution's industries, while negative balance-sheets effects are exacerbated in industries more 
dependent upon external finance, in which assets are more tangible, or in high fixed costs sectors. 
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I Introduction
According to Fischer (1999), strong exports, expansionary domestic policies and stable foreign financial
conditions are the key determinants of growth recovery after a financial crisis. A better understand-
ing of the reaction of trade after crises and the determination of the different elements underlying
this reaction are thus especially important to facilitate countries’ recovery. As they generally imply
important real exchange rate devaluations, the standard macroeconomic theory would predict that
currency crises should increase exports through a competitiveness effect. The observation of recent
emerging market crises however contradicts this intuitive theoretical effect: Despite real exchange rate
devaluations larger than 60 percents in most cases, exports either stagnated or actually fell for a year
or more in South-East Asian countries after the 1997-1998 crisis, and after the same kind of events
in Argentina, Uruguay (2002) and Brazil (1999).1 In the same way, no robust empirical evidence
emerges from the few papers which tried to assess the effect of currency crises on trade2: Campa
(2002) studies the impact of currency crises on South American countries’ exports, and finds a posi-
tive or insignificant impact, depending on the specification. In a more recent paper, Ma and Cheng
(2003), using a gravity-like equation, test the impact of financial crises - both currency and banking
crises - on international trade. Their results are even less clear-cut: currency crises do no seem to
have any impact in the short-run (or a slightly negative impact), and the sign of the long-run impact
depends on the period considered.
These sluggish responses of trade are all the more surprising in that there is growing evidence that
large devaluations are generally associated with a lower pass-through to domestic prices3, and are
thus more likely to generate larger competitiveness gains. In the same way, the few theoretical works
emphasizing a specificity of large exchange rate shocks yield the opposite intuition: because of the
existence of sunk costs, only large exchange rate shocks may incite firms’ entry into the export market,
significantly improving the level of exports (Baldwin and Krugman, 1989). We attribute the lack of
robust empirical evidence in past literature to missing variables or to an insufficient consideration of
the different mechanisms through which crises may affect imports and exports. The aim of this paper
1For example, exports decreased in the Philippines by 16%, in Thailand by 6% and in Indonesia by 10% in the year
that followed the crisis.
2The important economic literature generated by the numerous financial crises of the nineties generally looks at the
determinants of crises, and tries to predict their occurrence. These papers have studied the role of international trade
in explaining financial crises, showing in particular the significant role of trade linkages in facilitating the contagion
of crises (see for example Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, Glick and Rose, 1999 and Caramazza et al., 2004), or more
generally testing the importance of trade openness to the probability of the occurrence of financial crises (see, among
others, Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). Another strand of the literature has analyzed the implications of such events, by
looking generally at the impact of crises in terms of output variation. Among others, Gupta et al. (2003), Dooley (2000)
and Hong and Tornell (2005) study the effects of currency, banking and twin crises on output, and describe elements
which exacerbate or minimize the output cost. None of these papers look at the impact of crises on trade.
3See for example Burstein et al. (2005) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000).
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is to disentangle currency crises as both a relative prices change (with a positive effect on net exports)
and a financial event (with possibly a negative effect on net exports). The relative size of these two
elements, and therefore the total effect of crises on trade, depends on the extent of financial market
imperfections and on countries’ specialization.
We first build a partial equilibrium model of international trade with monopolistic competition that
allows the derivation of a gravity-like equation and clarifies the different mechanisms that a currency
crisis implies for trade. We show that when financial market imperfections are observed, such events
affect trade through their effect on (i) relative prices, which positively influence the intensive margin of
trade through a pro-competitive effect (ii) the fixed cost of entry on export market, which negatively
affect the extensive margin of trade through a balance-sheet effect. We then use a sectoral database
containing 27 industries and 32 countries over the period 1976-2002 to reveal the different channels
through which trade is affected by currency crises. Our empirical identification strategy allows us to
assess the significance of both effects and of their determinants.
First, we find that currency crises have a negative impact on both imports and exports. Their
impact on exports is long-lasting and negative: when controlling for exchange rate changes, we find that
exports remain on average below their natural level for six years after the event. We present evidence
suggesting that this persistence is due to balance-sheet problems generated by the combination of
high fixed costs of entry and foreign currency borrowing. Hence, both the relative prices and the
balance-sheet mechanisms are at work following a currency crisis, explaining the lack of effect found
by previous studies.
Second, the net effect of crises on exports largely depends on countries’ specialization: the positive
competitiveness effect is magnified by a specialization in high elasticity of substitution’s industries,
while negative balance-sheet effects are exacerbated in industries with a low degree of asset tangibility,
more dependent upon external finance or in high fixed costs sectors. Our results strongly support the
existence of high fixed costs of exports, and the view according to which aggregate variations of trade
flows are the result of an extensive margin adjustment. More generally, this paper provides empirical
evidence of a finance-based explanation for the exchange rate disconnect puzzle, i.e. to the apparent
disconnection between exchange rate variations and real macroeconomic variables (Obstfeld and Ro-
goff, 2000).
The present paper is related to the growing literature studying the links between finance and in-
ternational trade. Since the seminal paper by Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), the important impact of
financial development on international trade level and growth has been widely studied (Beck, 2002,
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Beck, 2003, Becker and Greenberg, 2004, Manova, 2005). As shown theoretically by Chaney (2005) or
Manova (2007), financial market imperfections may be especially important for exporters because they
may affect the number of exporters due to the existence fixed costs of exports. Empirically, various
papers, including Bernard et al. (2007), Das et al. (2007), Bernard and Wagner (1998) and Bernard
and Jensen (2004), provide evidence of such fixed costs using firm-level data. These fixed costs are
related to different activities such as gathering information on foreign markets, establishing a distribu-
tion system or more generally adapting products to foreign tastes and environment. They explain the
important movements of firms’ entry and exit on the export market found by other studies. According
to Eaton et al. (2004), this adjustment on the “extensive margin” is found to explain most of the vari-
ation of aggregate French exports.4 This paper contributes to this literature by showing theoretically
that more than influencing the level of exports, financial market imperfections may also affect their
reaction to exchange rate shocks. In presence of such imperfections, the adjustment of trade flows
after exchange rate movements may principally be due to variations in the number of exporters.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. In the next section, we present a simple model
connecting currency crises to international trade. Section 3 contains our empirical methodology, while
section 4 reviews the data used in the estimations. In section 5, we present the results on the overall
impact of crises on trade and on the relevance of the different channels of transmission. Finally, section
6 concludes and draws some policy implications.
II Theoretical underpinnings
The main reason for a potential non-traditional reaction of exports to a currency devaluation relies
on the existence of balance-sheet effects. The literature5 has stressed the important role of foreign
currency debt and credit constraints in explaining the occurrence of crises and modifying their impact.
In the aftermath of a currency crisis, the increase in the amount of foreign currency denominated debt
and the decrease in the amount of home currency denominated cash flow can dampen the positive
impact of the devaluation through a diminution of investment capacity. Empirically, it has been shown
that the tradable sector is more likely to face this negative effect, exporting firms being typically
4Regarding the theoretical and empirical importance of the extensive margin of trade, see in particular Melitz (2003)
or Broda and Weinstein (2006).
5See among others Krugman (1999a), Krugman (1999b), Aghion et al. (2001), Bacchetta (2000), Cespedes et al.
(2002), Cespedes et al. (2000). Calvo et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence of the importance of liability dollarization
as a predictor of sudden stops in capital flows for a sample of 32 emerging market countries. If foreign currency borrowing
is used as a larger part of total borrowing in countries that experienced financial crises, balance-sheet effects are more
likely to be larger after crises.
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more prone to borrow in foreign currency because of their better access to foreign financial markets
(Aguiar, 2005, Kawai et al., 2003). It is worth noting that, despite the obvious risk of such a behavior,
emerging markets’ firms seldom hedge against exchange rate fluctuations.6 Interestingly, an increased
expectation of devaluation does not seem to have any significant impact on firms’ borrowing and
investment behaviors (Galiani et al., 2003). More generally, based on firm-level data, studies have
found significant negative balance-sheet effects of currency crises on investment or profitability for
Mexico (Pratap et al., 2003, Pratap and Urrutia, 2004), Colombia (Echeverry et al., 2003), Peru
(Carranza et al., 2003) and Chile (Benavente et al., 2003). However, these studies do neither look
precisely at the effect of currency crises on trade flows nor on firms’ export decisions, so that one cannot
draw conclusions about the relative size of the two mechanisms, namely the positive competitiveness
and the negative balance-sheet effects.
1 Model
We present in this section a partial equilibrium model which aims at understanding the impact of
exchange rate movements on the extensive and the intensive margins of trade in the presence of
financial market imperfections. The world economy consists of 2 countries, i and j, with populations
of, respectively, Li and Lj households. Consumers in each country maximize utility derived from
the consumption of goods from K sectors, each of them being made of a continuum of differentiated
goods. Each firm produces a single good variety, and operates under Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
competition. Country i’s varieties sold in country j, sector k are defined over a continuum of mass
nijk.
The origin of movements in exchange rate will be left unexplained, but could be made endogenous
either by introducing monetary shocks moving the exchange rate under the assumption of rigid nominal
wages or aggregate productivity shocks that could take the form of productivity shocks in a perfectly
competitive tradable sector. The results would not be affected. The introduction of other hypotheses
on exchange rate determination would affect the general equilibrium in a way that would depend
on the chosen assumption. Since we want to assess the impact of nominal exchange rate variations
on trade without studying a determinant underlying the variations, we chose to keep exchange rate
exogenous. Depending on what determines them, exchange rate changes lead to other effects on trade,
magnifying or dampening the ones presented here.
6A number of theoretical reasons have been proposed to explain this fact. See, among others, Eichengreen and
Hausman (2000) and Chinoy (2001). It seems that the problem of the absence of hedging is closely related to the
“original sin” one, i.e. the impossibility for developing countries’ agents of borrowing in their own currency. According
to Eichengreen and Hausmann (2000) “these mismatches exist not because banks and firms lack the prudence to hedge
their exposures; the problem rather is that a country whose external liabilities are necessarily denominated in foreign
currency is, by definition, unable to hedge”. Indeed, assuming that someone on the other side of the market for foreign
currency hedges is strictly equivalent to assuming that the country can borrow abroad in its own currency.
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2 Set-up
Firms. Varieties are sold to domestic agents, and a subset is also exported. To start the domestic
production, a firm needs to employ ciik units of labor in country i, sector k (similarly, cjjk in the
country j). Firms use a linear technology in labor, and face two types of trade costs. First, shipping
goods abroad entails transportation costs, in the form of “iceberg” trade costs: firms have to export
τijq units of their variety in order to sell q units of it in the foreign country, with τij > 1.
7 Second, to
access market j, sector k, country i’s firms have to pay a fixed cost cijk in units of foreign labor. As
mentioned in the introduction, this fixed cost of exporting represents wages paid to foreign workers,
for example to acquire information or build distribution networks. We assume that all the fixed cost
of export is paid in the foreign country. Relaxing this hypothesis would not modify qualitatively any
result of the model as long as at least part of the fixed cost of export is paid in the foreign country.
The cost functions for domestically sold and exported productions for a firm h operating in country
i, sector k are:
Ciik,h(q) =
wiτii
α(h)
q + ciikwi Cijk,h(q) =
wiτij
α(h)
q + cijkwjεij (1)
where α(h) is the productivity of firm h, wi and wj are wages in countries i and j, and εij is the
exchange rate (an increase in εij represents a depreciation of the country i’s currency vis a vis country
j - εii = 1). In the spirit of Krugman (1980), we assume that all firms are symmetrical in terms of
productivity, and that productivity is the same across countries, i.e. α(h) = α ∀h. We consider in
appendix an extension of our model allowing for firms heterogeneity in terms of productivity. Without
loss of generality, in each country domestic labor units are the numeraire in terms of which all prices
are measured. Wages in both countries are then wi = wj = 1 ∀i.
Financial Market Imperfections. Contrary to standard international trade models, we suppose
here that financial markets are imperfect. Firms need to borrow to finance these entry costs. Each
firm’s borrowing capacity depends on its collateral Ω(h), given exogenously. Each firm draws its level
of collateral from a distribution with cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) Fk(Ω) with support
[Ωmink ,Ω
max
k ]. The distribution Fk(.) is assumed to be sector k-specific. This assumption reflects the
differences across sectors in terms of asset tangibility, as emphasized, among others, by Braun (2003)
and Braun and Larrain (2005): sectors characterized by a higher level of asset tangibility have a distri-
7We suppose here that τij is country-pair specific, but does not differ across sectors. This assumption is directly
driven by our empirical analysis: the lack of data on variable trade costs prevents us from considering cross-sectoral
differences.
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bution Fk(.) concentrated on the high values of collateral.
8 The idea behind this hypothesis is similar
to the one developed developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to address the issue of sector-specific
needs for external finance: asset tangibility has a large technological component, and is therefore a
good instrument for ranking the industries’ relative availability of tangible assets in every country.
Here, we thus assume that industries differ in terms of collateral distribution. Collateral gives access
to external finance to firm h: the amount it can borrow is µiΩ(h), with µi > 0 denoting the extent of
credit constraints in country i.
Finally, we assume a simplified view of the “original sin” problem: firms can only contract foreign-
currency denominated debt. Here again, assuming that firms borrow in both domestic and foreign
currency would make the model more complex without modifying qualitatively the results. Country
i’s firms then face the following borrowing constraint in country j’s currency to access the foreign
market:
µiΩ(h)/εij ≥ ciik/εij + wjcijk ⇔ Ω(h) ≥
ciik + εijcijk
µi
(2)
An exchange rate depreciation, i.e. an increase in εij , makes more likely the credit constraint to be
binding. Note that an implicit assumption in our framework is that financial constraints only affect
fixed costs of entry. The following results would be reinforced by the consideration of financial con-
straints on both marginal and fixed costs, but our goal here is to emphasize the important role of fixed
costs of exports in international trade’s adjustment. Evidence in line with this assumption has been
found by Berman and He´ricourt (2008). Our empirical results will also be in line with it.
Households. Households consume qk(h) units of each variety h of sector k, for all varieties available
in the market, and get a utility defined by:
U ≡
K∏
k=1
[ ∫ nijk
0
qk(h)
1− 1
σk dh+
∫ niik
0
qk(h)
1− 1
σk dh
]( σk
σk−1
)βk
(3)
where qk(h) denotes consumption of variety h from sector k, σk > 1 denotes the elasticity of substi-
tution of sector k, and
∑K
k=1 βk = 1. The representative household consumes a composite good of all
available varieties. The first order conditions leads to the following standard Dixit-Stiglitz demands:
8i.e. a support defined on higher values of Ω
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qijk(h) = βkYj
[εijpijk(h)]
−σk
P 1−σkjk
∀i, j (4)
where pijk(h) is the price of a variety produced in country i and sold in country j in sector k by firm
h. Pjk is the ideal price index for sector k in country j, defined as follows:
Pjk =
( ∫ nijk
0
[εijpijk(h)]
1−σk +
∫ njjk
0
[pjjk(h)]
1−σkdh
) 1
1−σk (5)
Prices and Profits. Profit maximization defines optimal prices, which equal marginal costs multi-
plied by a constant markup:
pijk = piikτij =
σk
σk − 1
τij
α
(6)
As firms are homogenous in productivity, those prices do not differ across firms. Using equations (6),
(4) and (5), we can express the value of total demands from country j of a firm operating in country
i, sector k:
xijk = pijkqijk = βkYj
εσkij p
1−σk
ijk
P 1−σkjk
(7)
Export-related operating profits for a firm producing in country i, sector k are positive because of
monopolistic competition, and can be written as follows:
Πijk =
xijk
σk
=
βkYjP
σk−1
jk
σk
( σk
σk − 1
)1−σk
ασk−1φijkε
σk
ij (8)
where φijk ≡ τ
1−σk
ij ∈ [0, 1] denotes the “freeness of trade”: the larger φijk, the freer trade. Note
that for the sake of simplicity, we assume zero interest rate. Under Dixit-Stiglitz competition, this
operating profit is simply the value of sales divided by σk. An increase in εij positively affects foreign
demand and operating profits through a standard pro-competitive effect.
In the next sections, we only consider sector k; we thus drop the k subscript and all sectoral
variables will refer to sector k when there is no ambiguity.
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3 Financial Market Imperfections, Exchange Rate Movements and Exports
Extensive Margin. In a Krugman (1980) type model of international trade with monopolistic com-
petition, in the absence of financial market imperfection, the number of firms is endogenous and given
by the zero-profit conditions:
Πij = cijεij ∀i, j (9)
i.e. operating profit on domestic and export markets equals the fixed cost of entry. These zero-profit
conditions give the number of domestic producers and exporters in the absence of any financial market
imperfection. An increase in εij has a positive effect on export-related total profits: because of the
competitiveness gain of domestic firms with respect to foreign ones, some firms enter, and the number
of firms operating increases after an increase in εij in the absence of financial imperfections. Note that
because of the foreign currency denomination of the fixed cost, this effect is lower than in standard
models: the pro-competitive gain of the depreciation is dampened by the increase in fixed cost - but
the effect is always positive.
Here, in addition to these conditions, the borrowing constraint (2) has to be verified. Only a subset of
firms are able to enter the market, this subset of firms depending on the collateral distribution F (Ω)
and on the extent of borrowing constraints µi. We can define the threshold of collateral Ωij such as
firms are not credit constrained from entering the export market:
Ωij =
cii + εijcij
µi
(10)
An increase in εij has a negative effect on borrowing capacity, called the balance-sheet effect of the
depreciation. Following Chaney (2008), we assume that the total mass of potential entrants (i.e. the
mass of firms able to draw a collateral in the distribution) is proportional to the country’ size Yi. The
maximum number of domestic producers and exporters given by the borrowing constraint (10) is:
nij = Yi[1− F (Ωij)] (11)
The final number of firms thus depends both on the zero profit conditions and on the borrowing
constraints. More precisely, the zero-profit conditions (9) give a number of firms which prevails in the
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absence of financial market imperfections. In the presence of financial imperfections, two cases arise:
1. For a sufficiently low level of credit constraints (high µi), or a sufficiently low level of exchange
rate εij the number of firms given by (9) is smaller than the number of firms given by the
borrowing constraint (11). nij is simply determined by the zero-profit condition - as in the
Krugman (1980) model.
2. Otherwise, if credit constraints are binding, the number of firms given by (9) is larger than the
number of firms effectively able to enter the market due to the borrowing constraints (11). The
number of firms is thus given by (11).
The effect of exchange rate changes on the extensive margin of trade is twofold. In the second
case (2), the number of firms simply decreases with εij : the threshold of collateral Ωij increases as the
currency depreciates, and the number of exporters decreases. In the first case (1), the depreciation
both increases operating profits - inciting entry - and makes the credit constraint more stringent.
The number of firms first increases, until some level of εij , from which the extensive margin starts
to decrease because the credit constraint becomes binding. Large increases in εij are more likely to
negatively affect the number of exporters, by making the case (2) more likely to prevail. Then:
Lemma 1. Without financial market imperfections (µi → ∞), nij is increasing with εij . For µi
small enough or εij large enough, the number of exporters nij is decreasing with εij .
A representation of this result is given in Figure 1. The lower µi, i.e. the larger credit constraints,
the more negative the reaction of the extensive margin of trade to an exchange rate depreciation. For
any finite value of µi, there exists a threshold of depreciation from which the borrowing constraints
becomes more stringent than the zero-profit conditions, i.e. from which nij decreases. When µi goes
to infinity (perfect financial market case), nij is always increasing with εij .
In the rest of this section, we shall only consider the second case (2) mentioned above, i.e. credit
constraints are binding and the number of exporting firms nij determined by the free-entry condition
is larger than the number of firms determined by the borrowing constraint. As a consequence, the
number of firms is directly given by (11). The first case (1) brings the same qualitative results, with
more complex expressions.
Intensive Margin. The values of individual exports - i.e. the intensive margin - is simply given
by (7), using (6) and (5):
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Figure 1: Reaction of the extensive margin of trade to an exchange rate depreciation
xij =
βYjε
σ
ijφij(
nijε
σ−1
ij φij + njjφjj
) (12)
Differentiating (12) with respect to εij , taking (11) into account, it can easily be shown that the
intensive margin increases with εij .
Lemma 2.
∂xij
∂εij
εij
xij
> 0,∀µi: the intensive margin of trade is increasing with the exchange rate
whatever the degree of financial market imperfections.
On the intensive margin, two positive effects are in action. The first is the traditional pro-competitive
effect: home varieties become cheaper than foreign ones. The second is due to the decrease in the
number of home varieties, which reduces competition and allows each domestic firm to export more.
Finally, xij(εij) is concave, i.e. the elasticity of the intensive margin to exchange rate depreciation
becomes less and less positive as εij increases.
Total Exports. Total exports are the product of both margins of trade:
Xij ≡ xijnij =
βnijYjε
σ
ijφij(∑N
k=1 nikε
σ−1
ik φik
) (13)
10
The elasticity of total exports to exchange rate variations is simply:
∂Xij
∂εij
εij
Xij
=
∂xij
∂εij
εij
xij
+
∂nij
∂εij
εij
nij
(14)
The first term is increasing with εij , while the second is decreasing with εij when the credit constraint
is binding. We then find the following testable proposition:
Testable Proposition 1. In presence of financial market imperfections, exports can either be in-
creasing or decreasing with εij .
Interestingly, not all depreciations are the same here: for a given number of exporters, larger de-
preciations are associated with a lower elasticity of the intensive margin to exchange rate; at the same
time, larger depreciations are more likely to decrease the number of firms, as shown in figure 1. More
precisely, the study of (14) leads to the following result:
Testable Proposition 2. In presence of financial market imperfections, the impact of an increase
in εij on Xij is non-linear, with a larger increase in εij having a more negative impact on total exports.
Currency crises are thus more likely to be associated with larger drops in the number of exporters
and with lower exports. The intuition is represented in Figure 2 and already given by equation (14).
Depreciation both increases the intensive margin and decreases the extensive margin. In Figure 2 the
absolute values of the reactions of both margins of trade are represented. The drop in the number of
exporters due to financial imperfections is more likely to overcome the competitiveness effect on the
intensive margin for larger values of εij .
Finally, sector specific elements deeply affect exports’ reaction to exchange rate variations. More
precisely, it can be shown that:
Testable Proposition 3. The effect of εij on Xij is:
(a) Increasing with elasticity of substitution (σ);
(b) Decreasing with fixed costs (cij);
(c) Increasing with asset tangibility (F (Ω));
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Figure 2: Reactions to exchange rate depreciation of trade margins (left) and total exports (right)
The impact of exchange rate movements is magnified by a high elasticity of substitution because
the increase in foreign demand toward home country varieties, i.e. the competitiveness effect is larger
when goods are more substitutable (a). On the contrary, larger fixed costs magnify the balance-sheet
effect, leading more firms to exit the export market following an exchange rate devaluation (b). Fi-
nally, the distribution of collateral matters: if the distribution F (.) is defined over large values of
Ω, the balance-sheet effect will be dampened (c). More generally, a sectoral differentiation of trade
flows may allow us to understand the way in which countries’ specialization affects their reaction to
currency crises. In appendix 1 we calibrate the model for different values of these parameters. The
impact of the exchange rate on total exports crucially depends on those parameters, which can reverse
the response to an exchange rate devaluation, and in particular to large exchange rate shocks.
4 Sunk costs, foreign currency borrowing and the Long-Run impact of crises
The above intuitions are based on a static framework, where firms pay a fixed cost of export, but
where there is no difference between sunk and fixed costs. The difference between the short and the
long run effects of crises may be important as well. We discuss in this section the long-run impact of
currency crises on exports.
Assume that firms have to pay a sunk cost to enter the export market for the first time, and a
maintenance cost to remain an exporter in each subsequent period. These fixed costs, as previously,
are financed through foreign currency denominated debt. In that case, a permanent decrease in the
exchange rate (a currency crisis) that happens after a firm’s entry will have two effects: (i) a com-
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petitiveness effect which increases the firm’s expected profits, thus generating entry incentives; (ii)
a balance-sheet effect, i.e. an increase in the amount of debt repayments, that increases the firm’s
default and exit probability. For sufficiently large devaluations, the increase in debt repayment will
be too strong, so that the firm will default on its debt, this in turn generating in the subsequent
period increasing financing difficulties, both because of the lower exchange rate level that increases
the borrowing constraints and because of increasing interest rates charged by financial intermediaries
due to the previous default. Once they have been forced to exit, and provided that the exchange rate
does not return to its pre-crisis level, firms’ may not re-enter, as borrowing conditions may be less
favorable than before the devaluation. Therefore, both the number of exporters and total exports may
be negatively and persistently affected by a currency crisis.
Interestingly, this non-linear effect of exchange rate shocks may be reinforced by the consideration of
elements outside the model. In particular, the existence of incomplete pass-through (due to pricing-to-
market behavior, staggered price contracts or distribution costs9) may limit the competitiveness effect
in the short-run, while leaving unchanged the balance-sheet effect. Large exchange rate shocks may
exacerbate the gap between the lack of pro-competitive effect and the increase in foreign-denominated
debt, and generate an important fall in the extensive margin in the following periods. In the aftermath
of the crisis, the coexistence of balance-sheet problems and sunk costs of exports can thus lastingly
decrease the number of exporting firms and have a persistent effect on the level of exports. We will
test in the empirical part the following proposition:
Testable Proposition 4. Large increases in εij have a negative and persistent impact on exports,
especially when firms are more indebted in foreign currency.
Interestingly, this intuition leads to the exact opposite result of Baldwin and Krugman (1989). Accord-
ing to these authors, when financial markets are perfect, only large devaluations generate a sufficient
pro-competitive effect to incite entry and increase exports. Here, when firms borrow in foreign cur-
rency under credit constraints, the increase in debt repayment generates financing difficulties in the
following period and forces some firms to exit the export market: exports decrease and do not increase
as long as the exchange rate remains below its pre-crisis level. This is especially the case when the
devaluation is large. This effect should be magnified in sectors associated with a low elasticity of
substitution, in which the pro-competitive effect should be lower, and thus more likely to be overcome
by the balance-sheet effect. In the same way, sectors in which fixed costs of exports are high and asset
9See, among many others, Corsetti and Dedola (2005), Cook and Devereux (2006) or Devereux et al. (2004).
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tangibility is low are more likely to endure long-lasting drops in exports following a currency crisis
because of the large balance-sheet effect.
5 Imports
This simple model enlightens how high fixed export costs and financial market imperfections can inter-
act with exchange rate movements to create non-conventional effects on international trade. Exports
and imports are considered in a symmetrical way. Their reactions may however be distinct if fixed
trade costs are mainly supported by exporters. In that case, the above-mentioned balance-sheet effects
may only be relevant for the financing of export activities, whereas the effect of foreign currency bor-
rowing on imports is likely to be smaller since the fixed costs associated with this activity are lower.
The reaction of imports should then mainly depend on the (negative) pro-competitive effect, and be
more transitory than the reaction of exports. In the next empirical section we test the relevance of the
balance-sheet effect on both exports and imports. Our results support both the view that balance-
sheet effects are relevant because of the existence of fixed costs, and that imports are less dependent
on such fixed costs.
6 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the different channels through which trade may be affected by currency crises and
the financial or sectoral elements that may magnify or reduce their impact. The impact of currency
crises on imports is unambiguously predicted to be negative. Exports can either increase or decrease
after a currency crisis. To assess the relevance of the different channels, one needs to take into account
firms’ borrowing behavior and their sectoral specialization, because differences in the levels of fixed
costs, asset tangibility and elasticities of substitution can magnify one channel or the other. Also, a
larger sectoral need for external finance (as defined by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) may magnify the
balance-sheet effect of crises, since in the aftermath of a currency devaluation borrowing difficulties
should be more salient in these sectors. All these elements interact with each other: the level of fixed
costs influences the impact of crises in sectors characterized by a low asset tangibility ; the share of
foreign denominated debt has a larger impact on the export reaction of industries using a large amount
of external finance. Hence, a sectoral differentiation of trade flows allows us to discriminate among
the different channels through which currency crises are transmitted to international trade.
Finally, all these effects presuppose that a currency crisis indeed leads to a currency devaluation, and
most of them implicitly suppose that a nominal devaluation turns into a real devaluation. The first
assumption is actually not systematically true, because a currency can be successfully defended after
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Table 1: Currency Crises and Trade: channels of transmission
Exports Imports
Currency Crisis
Competitiveness + -
Balance-sheet - -
Total Effect ? -
Magnification
Fixed Costs -
Elasticity of Substitution + -
Asset Tangibility +
External Financial Dependence -
a speculative attack by a variation in the interest rate or international reserves. However, empirically,
most of currency crises leads to a currency devaluation10. In the same way, empirical evidence shows
that only a small share of nominal devaluations after currency crises are transmitted to domestic
prices.11
10According to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), only 11% of the 128 crises they registered between 1980 and 1998 did
not lead to a devaluation.
11Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) have shown that less than 20% of the currency devaluation was reflected in the inflation
rate 12 months after the 1997 Asian crisis.
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III Empirical Methodology
As mentioned above, total bilateral exports simply equal the product of the intensive and extensive
margins of trade, i.e. export per firm multiplied by the number of exporters. Using equations (13),
we get:
Xijk ≡ nijk × xijk = nijk(τij)
1−σk(Pjk)
σk−1
(piik
εij
)1−σk
Yjk (15)
Following Head and Mayer (2000), taking the ratio of Xijk over Xjjk, country’s j imports from itself
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in sector k, we are left with the relative number of firms and relative costs in i and j:
Xijk
Xjjk
=
nijk
njjk
( τij
τjj
)1−σk(εijpjjk
piik
)σk−1
(16)
The main reason for relying on this specification is that the prices indexes disappear from the equation.
As suggested by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the impossibility of observing those price indexes
(or multilateral resistance indexes) can be solved empirically by introducing country fixed effects.
However, whereas this methodology is consistent for cross-section estimations, it is not able to capture
the variations in the price indexes, which may be large in a panel estimation with a sufficiently long
time dimension. The use of the Head and Mayer’s (2000) type of specification solves this problem.
From equation (11), the number of exporters is given by Yi(1 − Fk(cijkεij/µi)). The number of
country j’s domestic producers in sector k, njjk, is positively related to country j’s size Yj, inversely
related to the level of financial market imperfections, but does not depend on the exchange rate’s level.
We finally get:
Xijk
Xjjk
=
(Yi
Yj
)( τij
τjj
)1−σk(εijpjjk
piik
)σk−1( 1− Fk(cjjk/µj)
1− Fk[(ciik + cijkεij)/µi]
)
(17)
The last term of equation (17) gives the impact of a currency crisis in countries i, and more precisely
on the extensive margin of trade through the balance-sheet effect, which does not come from the com-
petitiveness effect, and which is captured by the real exchange rate term. As mentioned before, the
negativeness of this impact is increasing with the extent of foreign currency borrowing, with the level
of fixed costs and the lack of asset tangibility. Elasticity of substitution magnifies the competitiveness
effect, i.e. the role of relative prices. As mentioned before, we expect large exchange rate devaluations
12i.e. total domestic production minus exports.
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to have a more negative impact than smaller variations.
Basic specification
In logarithms, our basic specification takes the form of a traditional gravity-like equation augmented
with crisis dummies:
log
(Xijk,t
Xjjk,t
)
= α1 + α2 log
(Yi,t
Yj,t
)
+ α3 log
(εijpjjk,t
piik,t
)
+
7∑
m=−2
βmCCi,t−m +
7∑
m=−2
γmCCj,t−m
+
7∑
m=−2
δmBCi,t−m +
7∑
m=−2
θmBCj,t−m + ηijk + ξt + νijk,t (18)
where CCi,tt is a a binary variable which equals 1 when country i experienced a currency crisis at year
t. The competitiveness effect is captured by
εij,tpjjk,t
piik,t
, while CCi,t represents the balance-sheet effect
of large devaluations.13
To assess the impact of crises on imports, we introduce currency crisis dummies for the importer
country (CCj,t); we also control for the occurrence of banking crises in exporter (BCi,t) and importer
countries (BCj,t). All crisis variables are introduced with several lags in order to test the long-run
impact of such events on trade as evoked in the previous section. ξt is a full set of year dummies, and
ηijk represents fixed effects specific to the pair of countries ij and to the sector k. We thus use a panel,
within specification. This allows us to control for bilateral trade costs τij ; moreover, the inclusion of
fixed effects is useful for other reasons, linked to the relationship between crises and trade. We come
back to this issue at the end of the section. Finally, we estimate this equation at the sectoral level in
order to assess the role of the magnification channels mentioned before.
We expect the signs of α2 and α3 to be positive: bilateral exports increase with relative produc-
tion and the inverse of the real exchange rate (pro-competitive effect). We introduce two leads and
seven lags of the crisis dummies into the equation in order to test the long-run or delayed impact of
crises on trade. The number of lags is chosen mainly to keep a significant number of crises in the
sample: the inclusion of a larger number of lags prevents the crises of the late nineties to be on the
estimations. Nevertheless, we present robustness checks in the appendix that show that our results
remain qualitatively unchanged when we modify the number of lags. Finally, it seems necessary to
13Note that, as explained in more details in the next section, the currency crisis term is computed using the ex-
change rate with respect to the US Dollar, whereas the real exchange rate is bilateral. The latter thus captures the
competitiveness effect, while the former represents the effect of foreign currency borrowing.
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include banking crisis dummies into this specification because both events are often closely related14,
although they theoretically lead to very distinct effects. Banking crises are likely to be followed by
important financing difficulties that may have a negative impact on trade.
The inclusion in the specification of relative prices / real exchange rate allows us to capture the
competitiveness effect. We estimate the above equation with and without including this variable.
When we exclude it, the βm, i.e. the coefficient on the currency crisis variable for the exporter, can
be either positive or negative. The inclusion of the real exchange rate is intended to decrease the esti-
mated value of these coefficients. The γm are theoretically negative for all lags, reflecting the negative
effect of currency crises on imports. They are expected to be more negative when prices are excluded.
Finally, the relative sizes of the estimated βm and γm delivers insights about the persistence of the
reactions of exports and imports to currency crises.
Channels of Transmission
The estimation of equation (18) tests the total effect of currency crises on trade, which we expect to
be negative. However, it does not allow to draw any conclusion on the precise channels of transmission
underlying this effect, i.e. whether it comes from the combination of financial market imperfections
and fixed costs of export. The theoretical section highlighted the fact that the relevance of both chan-
nels - the competitiveness and the balance-sheet channels - may differ across countries (depending
on the extent of foreign currency borrowing) and across sectors (depending on the levels of elastic-
ity of substitution, fixed costs, asset tangibility and external financial dependence). To disentangle
the impacts of each channels, we thus introduce interaction terms into the basic equation between
our variables of interest and financial imperfections or sectoral characteristics. The second estimated
specification will take the form:
log
(Xijk,t
Xiik,t
)
= α1 + α2 log
(Yjk,t
Yik,t
)
+
n∑
m=0
pim log
(εijpjjk,t−m
piik,t−m
)
+
n∑
m=0
βmCCi,t−m +
n∑
m=0
γmCCj,t−m
+
n∑
m=0
δmBCi,t−m +
n∑
m=0
θmBCj,t−m +
n∑
m=0
ωmFCBi,t ∗ CCi,t−m +
n∑
m=0
κmFCBj,t ∗ CCj,t−m
+
n∑
m=0
τm log(σk) ∗ log
(εij,t−mpjjk,t−m
piik,t−m
)
+
n∑
m=0
φmSpeck ∗ CCi,t−m + ηijk + ξt + ρij,t (19)
14See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and the literature on twin crises.
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where FCBi,t denotes Foreign Currency Borrowing in country i at year t, σk the elasticity of sub-
stitution and Speck either fixed costs, asset tangibility or the financial dependence of sector k. As
argued before, we expect currency crises to have a more negative impact when firms’ foreign currency
borrowing is large (ωm, κm < 0) because of negative balance-sheet effects. The estimated coefficient
on exports should be larger than the one on imports because of the potentially higher fixed costs asso-
ciated with the export activity (ωm > κm). The balance-sheet effects are expected to be magnified by
greater financial dependence or higher fixed costs (φm < 0), and elasticity of substitution is expected
to magnify the competitiveness channel (τm > 0).
Econometric Issues
Different simultaneity and reverse causality biases may arise when considering the impact of currency
crises on trade. First, both trade flows and the probability of a crisis may be affected by external,
time-specific shocks - for example commodity prices shocks or US interest rate variations. The inclu-
sion of year dummies in the equation is therefore crucial. Second, some simultaneity problems may be
present because of crisis contagion. The use of a gravity-like framework allows us to take this issue into
account: the inclusion of the importer crisis dummies captures the decline in trade in the exporting
country due to the devaluation of its partner’s currency. This contagion issue is even more important
when trade is naturally high between the two countries. Introducing country-pair specific effects into
the equation solves this problem. There only remain the problems of the country-time specific factors
that may affect both trade and the likelihood of crises, and the fact that the level of trade itself should
influence the probability of occurrence of crises through trade balance and international reserves. To
take the first issue into account, we include in the last set of estimations country-time dummies to
check the robustness of our results. These effects cannot be included in the other specifications, in
which our variables of interest are country-time specific too. The reverse causality problem is harder
to take into account because of the lack of good instruments - variables correlated with currency crises
which are not affected by trade. Here again, the use of a gravity equation reduces the problem: it
seems less likely that sectoral bilateral trade influences the likelihood of currency crises than total
trade. All sectoral bilateral trade levels have to decrease in order to have an impact on trade balance
and on currency crises. Moreover, we introduce into the equation leads terms of the currency crisis
dummies, which capture the pre-crisis level of bilateral trade.
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IV Data
Gravity Variables
We use a large sectoral database of bilateral trade which combines COMTRADE and CEPII data
for bilateral trade and UNIDO data for production, for 26 ISIC 3-digit industries between 1976 and
2002. The relative prices are captured by the price levels of GDP; the data comes from the Penn
World Tables v.6.1.15
Financial Crises
The simplest way to identify currency crises has been proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996): they
define a currency crash as a large change in the nominal exchange rate (25 percent) that is also ac-
companied by substantial increase in the rate of change of the nominal depreciation (10 percent). As
we already mentioned, most often, speculative attacks have been resolved through a devaluation of
the currency or its flotation. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to take into account the possibility of
currency defenses by central banks through contractionary monetary policies or the selling of foreign
exchange reserves. The most common way to put together these elements is to compute a “foreign
exchange market pressure” index. This is the method used in most studies that deal with currency
crises. The computed index takes into account both exchange rate and international reserves varia-
tions:16 it is a weighted average of these two indicators with weights such that the two components
have equal sample volatility.17 Large positive readings of this index indicate speculative attacks.18
The problem with this approach is the definition of the threshold above which we consider that the
index indicates a crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) use a value of three standard deviations above
the mean; for Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), a crisis is said to occur when this index exceeds one and
a half standard deviations above its mean. The identification of crises is dependent on this choice, so
it seems necessary to control the empirical results by using different thresholds.
We have constructed different indexes of currency crises using both Frankel and Rose’s (1996)
method and the “foreign exchange market pressure” one, with two different thresholds. In the next
estimations we use an index of currency crisis computed as exchange rate market pressure as in
15A more detailed description of the trade, production and prices database is available on the CEPII’s website, at the
following address: http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm.
16It is often difficult to introduce interest rates because of lack of data. Moreover, using a large sample of developed and
developing countries, Kraay (2003) has shown that interest rates have generally been ineffective in defending currencies
during speculative attacks.
17This weighting scheme prevents the much greater volatility in the exchange rate from dominating the crisis measure.
18See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Hong and Tornell (2005), Eichengreen and Bordo (2000) or Eichen-
green et al. (1996) for details about the computation.
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Eichengreen and Bordo (2002). Robustness checks have been made to check the results with the other
indexes.
Finally, to control for the occurrence of banking crises, we use the Caprio and Klingebiel (2002)
data. Their list of banking crises is highly consistent with previous studies, and includes a sizeable
number of countries and years. Moreover, they provide a description of each crisis and a distinction
between small - “borderline” - and large - “systemic” - crises.
Channels of Transmission
Foreign currency borrowing. We use different measures to assess the impact of foreign currency bor-
rowing. The first is constructed from the WBES (World Bank) data, a firm-level survey that covers
more than 10, 000 firms in 80 countries, and contains for each firm the share of foreign debt over total
debt. For each country, an average index of firms’ currency borrowing is computed. The results of our
computations are reported in the appendix. As the WBES contains information on small and medium
firms, which have restricted access to foreign financial markets, it seems logical to find small shares of
foreign borrowing. Nevertheless, the ranking of the different countries is found to be consistent with
empirical observations (the level of foreign borrowing in Argentina, a highly “dollarized” economy, is
much higher than the share of industrialized countries).
The WBES data is only available for the year 2000 - so we implicitly suppose here that this element
relies on financial imperfections that are country-specific, and has an important structural component.
It seems however unlikely that the level of dollarization has not evolved over time, in particular during
a change of currency regime (Martinez and Werner, 2002). To ensure the robustness of our results,
we use two alternative, time-varying measures. The first comes from the Inter-American Development
Bank and covers 10 Latin American countries over the period 1990-2002. It has been constructed from
a panel of Latin-American listed companies. For more details on this data, see Kamil (2004). The
second measure has be constructed by Carlos Arteta19, and contains data on deposit money banks’
foreign-currency-denominated credit to the resident private sector for 40 developing and transition
economies. Depending on the country, the data either come from the International Financial Statis-
tics (IMF) or Central Banks. For more information on this dataset, see Arteta (2005) or Arteta (2003).
Both databases provide time-varying measures of foreign currency borrowing, but the information is
either available for a small number of countries (IADB data) or for a small number of years (Arteta’s
data). To keep a maximum of observations in our sample, we chose to present the results using the
three measures. Table 5 (Appendix) summarizes the results obtained for two selected indicators of
19We are grateful to Carlos Arteta for sharing this database.
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financial crises, and for the first measure of foreign currency borrowing.
Sectoral Data. Finally, we use different sectoral data to test the interaction between currency crises,
country specialization and international trade. We first consider the role of elasticity of substitution by
using the Broda and Weinstein’s (2004) estimates. Sectoral asset tangibility comes from Braun (2003),
and represents, for each sector “natural availability of assets that serve well at protecting outside in-
vestors in an incomplete contracting setting”.20 Finally, the data on external financial dependence
comes from Rajan and Zingales (1998); external dependence is defined by these authors as the “share
of capital expenditures that are not financed by cash flow from operations”. As emphasized by Braun
(2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1998), both asset tangibility and external financial dependence are
expected to have a large technological component. Therefore, the constructed variable is a good in-
strument for ranking the industries’ relative availability of tangible assets and need for external finance
in every country. Sectoral data on elasticity of substitution, asset tangibility and external financial
dependence are given in Table 6 (Appendix).
Fixed costs. We use two different proxies for fixed costs. The first is a country-specific proxy com-
ing from the Doing Business Database (World Bank) and consists in the ranking of the destination
country in terms of “Trading Across Borders”. More precisely, it summarizes different custom pro-
cedures, including the number of documents required, number of days, and cost to export to this
country. Our second proxy is the Rauch (1999) classification of traded goods. In this classification,
goods are separated into three categories: homogenous, reference prices and differentiated. One can
expect a larger fixed export cost for differentiated goods because an exporter specialized in very differ-
entiated goods may face larger costs linked to the research for trading partners, marketing or publicity.
Put together, our database covers 32 countries and 27 3-digits ISIC sectors over the period 1976-
2002.
20More precisely, at the firm level, it represents the sum of net property, plant and equipment divided by the book
value of assets.
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V Results
1 Overall Impact
Table 2 summarizes the impact of currency crises on trade during the year of the crisis and the
following one. In these estimations we use a broad definition of currency crises21 and we consider only
systemic banking crises as listed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). The detailed list of these events is
given in the appendix. The first part of the table presents the gravity variables coefficients, and the
second part the impact of currency crises. In columns (A) to (E) we include exporter and importer
dummies and estimate our basic specification with panel random effects, controlling for country-pair
characteristics. The traditional control variables are included: bilateral distance, contiguity, free trade
agreement, colonial relationship and common language between countries i and j. The data comes
from the CEPII and Rose (2005). Column (F) presents our preferred specification, with fixed effects.
Gravity variables are highly significant and have the expected signs, and the estimated coefficients
are in line with the results found by previous studies.22 The impact of crises on both exports and
imports is negative and significant when real exchange is included in the estimations (columns (C),
(D) and (F)). The reaction of imports is more negative than that of exports. When the real exchange
rate is excluded (column (E)), its effect on bilateral exports in the year that follows the event becomes
insignificant. This suggests that - at least in the short-run - the competitiveness effect is not suffi-
ciently important to generate a beneficial impact on the level of exports, i.e. that the other channels
(and in particular the balance-sheet channel) are strong enough to cancel the benefits of the currency
devaluation. On the import side, the currency crisis coefficients decrease when relative prices are ex-
cluded. Finally, as expected, the inclusion of year dummies significantly decreases the negative impact
of crises on both exports and imports, but the effect remains significant. These results are robust to
the use of different estimation techniques23 and definitions of currency crises.
21More precisely, a currency crisis is said to occur when the exchange market pressure index exceeds 1.5 standard
deviations above its mean.
22See for example Mayer and Zignago (2005).
23Panel Fixed and Random effects are presented here. The use of a left-censored Tobit estimation, which aims at taking
into account the important number of zero values of sectoral bilateral trade flows dependent variable in our sample, leads
to the same results, which are available upon request.
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Table 2: Short Run Impact of Currency Crises on Trade
Dependent Variable : Relative Trade
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Gravity Variables
Relative Production 0.550a 0.531a 0.550a 0.531a 0.514a 0.520a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Real Exchange Rate 0.529a 0.542a 0.534a 0.541a 0.538a
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Relative Distance -1.193a -1.294a -1.197a -1.294a -1.297a
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Contiguity 0.345a 0.436a 0.350a 0.437a 0.429a
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Free Trade Agreements 0.568a -0.009 0.531a -0.021 -0.028 -0.088
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Colonial Relationship 0.952a 0.956a 0.948a 0.954a 0.964a
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087)
Common Language 0.850a 0.846a 0.849a 0.845a 0.846a
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Crises Variables
Currency Crisis, exporter -0.153a -0.072a -0.070a -0.070a
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Currency Crisis, exporter (t-1) -0.096a -0.053a -0.008 -0.056a
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Currency Crisis, importer -0.197a -0.119a -0.106a -0.123a
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Currency Crisis, importer (t-1) -0.147a -0.088a -0.117a -0.092a
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Exp. / Importer Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.36
Observations 287,791
Number of groups 23,537
Estimation Random Effects Within
Significance levels: c 10%, b 5%, a 1%. Robust Standard Errors into parentheses. Intercept and banking crises coefficients
not reported.
Figures 3 and 4 show the long-run impacts of currency crises on trade. Using a methodology similar
to Martin et al. (2008), we estimate equation (18), which includes seven lags and two leads of each
crisis dummy, and plot graphs with respect to the estimated coefficient of these variables and to their
95% confidence interval - which are represented by the dashed lines. The gravity equation is supposed
to give an estimate of the “natural level” of trade flows between two countries, depending on their
sizes, distance and others country-pair characteristics, captured here by the fixed effects. Thus, the
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estimated coefficients of the lags and leads of the crisis dummies introduced in the gravity equation
can be interpreted as deviations from the “natural level” of trade generated by currency crises.
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Figure 3: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: Exports
The estimated impact of currency crises on trade is different according to the case considered. Let
us first consider the reaction of exports (Figure 3). The crisis has an immediate and long-lasting
negative impact: exports decrease during the year of the crises, and remain below their natural level
during six years after the event. This result underlines the persistence of large exchange rate shocks
on international trade. As the results of the next section suggest, contrary to Baldwin and Krugman
(1989), this persistence may not only be due to the sunk character of fixed costs of exports but also
to the existence of financial market imperfections generating important balance-sheet effects, which
in turn increase the cost of trade during the following years. More precisely, large devaluations can
durably decrease the number of exporters and have a persistent negative impact on the total level of
trade. Because of the sunk character of fixed costs, exiting firms may not re-enter after the shock.
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Figure 4: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: Imports
The impact of currency crises on imports (Figure 4) is less persistent. Imports plummet in the short
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run by more than 10%, and remains statistically below their natural level during the three years that
follow the crisis. As the results in the next section will suggest, negative balance-sheet effects are in-
significant on imports, suggesting that fixed costs associated with this activity are lower. The negative
impact of currency crises on imports may partly be due to the recession that often follows a financial
crisis, and which can involve a fall in demand for both home and foreign goods. As we include in
the specification the sectoral production of the country, which is only an imperfect measure of home
demand, we cannot fully control for this demand effect.
Finally, these results are qualitatively unchanged by the use of a different number of lags, neither
qualitatively nor quantitatively.24 In the next sections we disentangle the main elements underly-
ing the above-mentioned results, by looking more precisely at the role of financial imperfections and
sectoral specialization.
2 Balance-sheet effect of currency crises
We first study the impact of foreign currency borrowing on the reaction of trade to a currency crisis. We
introduce interacted terms between currency crisis and foreign currency borrowing into our estimation.
We expect the sign of these variables to be negative; the sign of the currency crisis variable alone can
become either positive of negative; if it becomes positive, we can conclude that the negative effect of
currency crises found previously principally comes from this balance-sheet problem; if the coefficient on
the currency crisis dummy remains negative, the other mechanisms (volatility, cost channels) remain
relevant in explaining the negative reaction of trade flows after currency crises.
Our results are reported in Table 3. To allow a clearer reading the gravity variable coefficients are
not reported. Estimations (A), (B) and (C) use the indicator of foreign currency borrowing constructed
from WBES data, presented in the data subsection. In estimation (C), the real exchange rate variable
is excluded. We check the robustness of our results by using the time-varying measure of the Inter-
American development bank (estimations (D) and (E)) or the measure of Arteta (2005) (estimation
(F)). The sample is importantly reduced since these measure are only available for a sub-sample of
countries (IADB measure) or for a reduced number of years (Arteta’s index). We only introduce three
lags in these specifications to keep a sufficient number of observations in our sample.
The results stress an important, negative and persistent role of foreign currency borrowing in the
impact of currency crises on exports. After one year, the coefficient of the currency crisis dummy
becomes insignificant or positive (depending on whether the competitiveness is taken into account
separately, as in columns (A) and (B), or through the currency crisis variable, as in column (C)),
24Results available upon request.
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suggesting that the balance-sheet effect of the currency crisis accounts for most of the total negative
effect of the event on exports. These results are confirmed by the use of the alternative measures
of foreign currency borrowing (columns (D), (E) and (F)). When we exclude the real exchange rate
variable (column (C)), i.e. when the currency crisis variable alone captures the whole effect of the
event - including the pro-competitive effect -, the coefficient on this variable becomes positive after one
year, meaning that, when the degree of foreign currency borrowing is very low, the overall impact of
the event on exports is positive. Currency crises then have an expansionary effect on bilateral exports
when there foreign currency borrowing is very low.
The reaction of imports is somewhat different. Balance-sheet effects are lower or insignificant
(columns (A), (B), (D)). This result supports the view according to which balance-sheet effects arise
because of the existence of high fixed costs that are mainly borne by exporters, and that post-crisis
export variation is principally explained by an adjustment of the extensive margin of trade.
Estimation (B) includes, in addition to the currency crisis dummy and the term interacted with
foreign currency borrowing, a term controlling for exchange rate volatility. Post-crisis exchange rate
levels are indeed often characterized by an important uncertainty. The impact of volatility on interna-
tional trade has been widely studied, but the results are mitigated, both empirically and theoretically
(see for example Tenreyro, 2007). Clark et al. (2004) explain this lack of robustness by the fact that
the exchange rate variability is the result of shocks which can themselves affect trade. For example,
exchange rate volatility can originate from measures of trade liberalization that increase the total vol-
ume of trade flows. Klaassen (2004) argues that the true effect of exchange rate risk on trade is difficult
to assess because export decisions are mostly affected by the probability distribution of the one-year
rate, which appears fairly constant over time. However, it seems necessary to take into account the
exchange rate riskiness in an empirical treatment of the impact of currency crises since the volatility
associated with such events is somewhat different and larger, and could well cause more important
effects. We have computed for each pair of countries and year of our sample an index of bilateral
volatility based on the monthly exchange rate of each currency against the SDR.25 The computation
of this volatility term follows the methodology of Tenreyro (2007). The introduction of this term does
not really modify the results: volatility is found to have an important negative effect on bilateral trade
flows. It explains a part of the negative reaction of imports in the short run - comparing estimations
(A) and (B), the estimated coefficients of the currency crisis dummies on imports go down in the year
of the crisis and the following one when we include the bilateral volatility term, while the coefficient
on exports is not significantly modified. Nevertheless, the impact of a currency crisis in the year of the
event remains negative even after we take volatility into account. This can be due to the fact that we
25The data comes from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
27
Table 3: Balance-sheet effects of currency crises on trade
Dep. Var Relative Trade
FCB Variable WBES IADB Arteta (2005)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Estimation (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Exports
Currency crisis (CCi) -0.127
a (0.018) -0.117a (0.019) -0.122a (0.018) -0.012 (0.062) 0.104 (0.106) 0.645a (0.157)
T − 1 0.002 (0.018) 0.003 (0.019) 0.053a (0.018) 0.040 (0.091) 0.221 (0.163) 0.059 (0.251)
T − 2 0.016 (0.019) 0.007 (0.019) 0.067a (0.018) 1.511a (0.217) 2.184a (0.468) 1.683a (0.294)
T − 3 -0.009 (0.018) -0.019 (0.018) 0.030c (0.018) 1.323a (0.224) 1.310a (0.412) 0.678a (0.253)
T − 4 -0.026 (0.017) -0.016 (0.018) 0.021 (0.018)
CCi × FCBi 0.014
a (0.003) 0.019a (0.017) 0.015a (0.003) 2.298a (0.666) 3.063b (1.358) -3.062a (0.711)
T − 1 -0.007a (0.003) -0.005b (0.002) -0.013a (0.003) 0.115 (0.243) 0.838 (0.575) 0.305 (0.625)
T − 2 -0.019a (0.004) -0.019a (0.004) -0.025a (0.003) -2.453a (0.452) -3.125a (0.850) -3.962a (0.658)
T − 3 -0.016a (0.003) -0.013a (0.003) -0.017a (0.003) -2.372a (0.475) -2.286a (0.858) -1.717a (0.566)
T − 4 -0.018a (0.003) -0.019a (0.003) -0.024a (0.003)
Imports
Currency crisis (CCj) -0.087
a (0.010) -0.062a (0.010) -0.073a (0.009) -0.105b (0.051) -0.280a (0.100) -0.081b (0.041)
T − 1 -0.105a (0.010) -0.091a (0.010) -0.117a (0.009) -0.147a (0.046) -0.371b (0.176) -0.127a (0.040)
T − 2 -0.113a (0.010) -0.098a (0.010) -0.126a (0.009) -0.085b (0.042) 0.218 (0.463) -0.041 (0.039)
T − 3 -0.120a (0.010) -0.104a (0.010) -0.144a (0.009) -0.090b (0.036) -0.807c (0.437) 0.020 (0.038)
T − 4 0.010 (0.010) 0.017c (0.010) -0.007 (0.009)
CCj × FCBj 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.003) 1.421 (1.347)
T − 1 -0.007b (0.003) -0.006c (0.003) -0.006c (0.003) 0.693 (0.515)
T − 2 -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.093 (0.871)
T − 3 -0.010a (0.003) -0.008b (0.003) -0.009a (0.003) 1.590c (0.882)
T − 4 -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
Bilateral ER Volatility -0.835a (0.090)
No. Obs. 247,794 240,623 257,199 18,321 3,817 22,280
No. Groups 23,172 23,162 23,230 5,280 1,482 3,906
Adj. R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.92 0.84
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Real Exchange Rate Included Included Excluded Included Included Included
FCB: Foreign Currency Borrowing. Panel, Fixed Effects estimations. Intercept, gravity equation variables and banking
crises dummies not reported. Significance levels: c 10%, b 5%, a 1%. Robust Standard Errors into parentheses. Estima-
tions (A), (B) and (C) uses the first measure of FCB, computed from WBES data. Columns (D) and (E) uses the second
measure, from the Inter-American Development Bank. Column (F) uses the measure constructed by Arteta (2005).
do not take into account the precise month of occurrence of the crisis. If our sample is biased toward
end-of-year crises, the crisis dummy will not capture the proper effect of the crisis, but rather the loss
of competitiveness due to the pre-crisis overvaluation of the currency.
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Another way to show the significance of balance-sheet effects on exports in the longer-run is to esti-
mate the specification including the crisis lags terms on two different sub-samples, defined according
to the level of foreign currency borrowing. Figure 5 represents the deviation from the natural level of
trade generated by a currency crisis in highly (respectively lowly) dollarized countries, i.e. in countries
in which the level of foreign currency borrowing is above (resp. below) the median of the WBES
measure. We do not include the real exchange rate term in these specifications, so that the plotted
impact represents the whole effect of the crisis on exports, including the competitiveness effect. The
difference between the two sub-samples is striking: exports plummet in the year that follow the crisis
in highly dollarized countries, while countries displaying a low ratio of foreign currency debt expe-
rience a significant increase in exports. The impact is persistent in both case, but of opposite sign.
This is consistent with the idea of Baldwin and Krugman (1989) that large devaluations should have
of positive and persistent impact on exports under perfect financial markets. On the contrary, the
existence of financial market imperfections such as foreign currency borrowing leads to a reversal of
the impact, namely a long-lasting drop in exports.
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Figure 5: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: foreign currency borrowing sub-
samples
These results strongly suggest that the impact of financial market imperfections is active both in the
short and long-run, and is especially important three to four years after the event. This supports the
view according to which currency crises not only increase entry difficulties, but also force some firms
to exit the export market, thus negatively affecting the level of exports in the long term through the
extensive margin of trade. Note that the use of alternative measures of foreign currency borrowing
does not alter the results.
29
3 Sectoral Specialization and the impact of currency crisis on exports
As previously emphasized, four major sectoral elements can modify the way exports react to a currency
crisis: (i) the elasticity of substitution, (ii) the amount of fixed costs, (iii) the degree of asset tangibility,
and (iv) the extent of external financial dependence. We first use as a proxy for fixed costs the ranking
of the destination country in terms of custom procedures described in the data section. The estimated
coefficient of the interaction of this variable with the currency crisis dummy is expected to be negative.
On the other hand, the real exchange rate terms are interacted with the level of elasticity of substitution
from Broda and Weinstein (2004), and the currency crisis variable with either the degree of sectoral
asset tangibility from Braun (2003) or the sectoral external dependence from Rajan and Zingales
(1998). If significant, the two first interaction terms are expected to have a positive sign, while the
last one is expected to be negative. Finally, we also interact our currency crisis dummy with elasticity
of substitution. As emphasized in the theoretical part, elasticity is supposed to affect only the pro-
competitive effect of the currency crisis, which is captured by the real exchange rate term: we thus
expect the coefficient on this interaction term to be insignificant.
Our results are presented in Table 4. To allow for a clearer reading, we only report the estimated
coefficients of the variables linked to currency crises and exports. To control for foreign currency bor-
rowing and exchange rate volatility does not alter the results. Consistent with theory, a lower elasticity
of substitution significantly dampens the competitiveness effect (column (A)): the interacted terms
between this variable and relative prices is positive and significant. Also in line with our prediction
is the fact that elasticity of substitution does not influence the reaction of trade to larger exchange
rate shocks: in estimation (B), the interaction between this variable and the currency crisis term
is insignificant. The reaction of exports to currency crises is also significantly affected by the other
elements: larger fixed costs (column (C)), lower asset tangibility (column (D)) and higher external
financial dependence (column (E)) magnify the negative effect on exports.
As in the previous section, for each sectoral variable, we can separate the sample into two sub-samples
according to the degree of fixed costs, asset tangibility and external financial dependence respectively.
Figures 6, 7 and 8 represent the deviation from the natural level of bilateral exports generated by
currency crises, according to these three elements. Figure 6 uses the Rauch’s sectoral classification
as a proxy for fixed costs. The created variable takes the value 1 if the sector contains principally
homogenous goods, 2 if it contains reference priced goods, and 3 if it contains differentiated goods.
An increase in this proxy is interpreted as larger sectoral fixed costs. Similar results are obtained with
the Doing Business destination-specific variable.
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Table 4: Specialization and the impact of currency crises on exports
Dep. Var Relative Trade
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Estimation (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Currency Crisis, exporter (CCi) -0.021
b (0.010) -0.087b (0.042) 0.004 (0.029) -0.123a (0.022) -0.038a (0.013)
T-1 -0.017c (0.010) -0.072c (0.042) 0.018 (0.029) -0.117a (0.022) -0.039a (0.013)
T-2 -0.036a (0.010) -0.027 (0.042) 0.046 (0.029) -0.088a (0.022) -0.032b (0.013)
T-3 -0.099a (0.010) -0.074c (0.042) -0.061c (0.031) -0.115a (0.022) -0.071a (0.013)
...
Elasticity× Real Exchange Rate 0.039 (0.027) 0.044c (0.027)
T-1 0.108a (0.027) 0.103a (0.028)
T-2 0.036 (0.028) 0.030 (0.028)
T-3 0.061b (0.026) 0.060b (0.027)
Elasticity× CCi 0.049 (0.030)
T-1 0.040 (0.030)
T-2 -0.004 (0.031)
T-3 -0.019 (0.030)
Fixed Cost (Doing Business)× CCi -0.019
b (0.008)
T-1 -0.023a (0.008)
T-2 -0.028a (0.008)
T-3 -0.009 (0.008)
Asset Tangibility× CCi 0.223
a (0.076)
T-1 0.216a (0.076)
T-2 0.132c (0.076)
T-3 0.074 (0.076)
External Dependence× CCi -0.097
a (0.033)
T-1 -0.095a (0.032)
T-2 -0.095a (0.033)
T-3 -0.082b (0.032)
Observations 235,702 235,702 261,936 246,013 261,936
Number of groups 23,046 23,046 23,288 21,673 23,288
Adj. R-Squared 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel Fixed Effects estimations. Intercept, gravity equation variables and banking dummies not reported. Significance levels: c
10%, b 5%, a 1%. Robust Standard Errors into parentheses.
Unambiguously, sectors characterized by low fixed costs, high asset tangibility and low external de-
pendence react more positively after the event. However, it is worth noting that neither sub-sample
is found to experience a positive and significant reaction, suggesting that, in the presence of financial
market imperfections, all manufacturing sectors are affected negatively by the crisis to some extent.
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Low Fixed Costs Sectors
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Figure 6: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: sectoral fixed costs sub-samples
High Asset Tangbility
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Low Asset Tangbility
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Figure 7: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: sectoral asset tangibility sub-samples
More generally, these results strongly suggest that the adjustment of trade to exchange rate movements
is correlated to country specialization. While this result does not constitute a real innovation - sectors
with higher price-to-demand elasticity are traditionally expected to react better after a devaluation -
the interesting point is that the role of specialization arises from the combination of financial market
imperfections and the fixed costs of exports. Moreover, these results support the existence of high
fixed costs of exports, and the view according to which aggregate variations of trade flows are the
result of an extensive margin adjustment.
Robustness. Different robustness checks were run to control our results. This results are quantita-
tively the same when: (i) we use different definitions of a currency crisis; (ii) we include country-year
dummies in the last set of estimates (where the our variables of interest are also sector-specific) to
take into account the potential omitted variable bias mentioned before (i.e. country-year elements
that may both affect trade and the probability of occurrence of currency crises); (iii) other estimation
techniques, including left-censored Tobit or Poisson estimations to account for the important number
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Low External Financial Dependence
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High External Financial Dependence
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Figure 8: Deviation from the natural level of trade after a currency crisis: sectoral external financial dependence
sub-samples
of zeros in the bilateral trade matrix; (iv) inclusion of other variables that can affect the way export
react to exchange rate variations, namely vertical integration, vertical specialization, product and
labor market rigidities; (v) inclusion of a different number of lags.26
4 Comparison of the different effects
Since the total impact of a currency crisis on exports depends on the values of the variables with
which the currency crisis is interacted, the previous results are not fully informative to provide a
single summary measure of the effect. Instead, it may be better to show how the effect of currency
crisis varies for different levels of the different variables. We do so in Figures 9 to 10. Specifically,
these figures present the total effect on bilateral exports of a currency crisis on year after the event
for each value that a given variable corresponding to a given channel (foreign currency borrowing,
fixed costs, asset tangibility and external financial dependence) can take in the sample. Since only
linear interaction effects are considered, the effect of crises on exports can be represented as a linear
function of each channel variable. The dotted lines represents the corresponding 95% confidence bands,
constructed with the estimated coefficient standard errors.27 These figures are based on estimations
given in Tables 3 (estimation (C)) and 4 (estimations (C), (D), (E)). Note that these graphs are based
on estimations in which the real exchange rate variable is not included, i.e. they represent the whole
impact of the crisis - including the competitiveness effect for different degrees of financial imperfections
and sector-specific elements.
26Results are available upon request.
27From our regression model, the effect of a currency crisis on exports at year t is given by (βCC+βINT ∗Channel)CCi,
where βCC and βINT are respectively the estimated coefficients on a currency crisis and on its interaction between a
given channel variable. Channel follows a fixed set of values (given in appendix in Tables 5 and 6). The confidence
intervals can be constructed from the following expressions for the variance of the currency crisis effect: V ar(βCC) +
V ar(βINT )Channel
2 + Cov(βCC , βINT )Channel, where the variances and covariances of the estimated coefficients are
obtained from our panel estimation.
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Figure 9: Total effect of a currency crisis on exports one year after the event, according to the country’s level
of foreign currency borrowing (left) and fixed costs (right)
Figure 10: Total effect of a currency crisis on exports one year after the event, according to the sectoral level
of asset tangibility (left) and external financial dependence (right)
The total effect is found to be quantitatively different for each channel. The X axis of each figure
represents the set of values that can be taken by each indicator, given in Tables 5 and 6. The larger
variance is linked to foreign currency borrowing: a currency crisis is found to have either a positive
impact on exports in countries characterized by a very low level of dollarization (typically developed
countries) or a strong negative impact in highly dollarized countries - after one years, exports are 20%
below their natural level in a country like Argentina (Figure 9, left).
The level of fixed costs also influences importantly the reaction of exports to a currency crisis:
the reaction range from zero to −15% (Figure 9, right). The degree of asset tangibility strongly
drives the reaction of exports: the total effect ranges from −12% for the lowest tangibility to 3% for
the highest (Figure 10, left). Finally, financial dependence is found to magnify the negative impact
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of the crisis on exports, but does not fully explains the presence of balance-sheet effects, since the
total effect is negative whatever the sector (Figure 10, right). Overall, these graphs clearly suggest
that balance-sheet effects due to the combination of financial market imperfections and fixed costs of
exports importantly drive the reaction of export to large exchange rate shocks.
VI Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
In this paper we have investigated the impact of currency crises on international trade, and determined
the elements that improve or worsen this impact. We have contributed to fill a gap left by the previous
literature, which mostly worked on trade as a cause of the crisis.
We first showed that currency crises have a long-lasting negative effects on the level of trade flows.
Controlling for real exchange rate changes, we found that exports remain below their natural level
for six years after a currency crisis. Moreover, we have studied the relevance of the different channels
through which international trade may be affected after a currency crisis. The negative and persistent
impact of currency crises on exports is mostly due to negative balance-sheet effects that comes from the
high level of firms’ foreign currency borrowing in a number of countries. Finally, the specialization of
countries deeply affects their reaction to a crisis. Specialization in sectors characterized by important
fixed costs, high product differentiation (low elasticity of substitution between goods) and strong
financial dependence are more prone to endure important drops in exports after a currency crisis. In
addition to allowing a better understanding of the reaction of trade to currency crises, our work has
important policy implications since we define elements that should improve of worsen the impact of
crises on trade, thus facilitating or worsening the crisis recovery.
More generally, our work contributes to the increasingly large literature focusing on the links
between financial imperfections and international trade. The above results suggest that most of the
adjustments of international trade to exchange rate shocks comes from variations of the extensive
margin of trade, i.e. from variations in the number of exporting firms. The main area of future research
on this subject should be a more precise study of the interactions between exchange rate movements,
financial imperfections and firms export decisions, using firm-level data. Equally interesting is the
reaction of trade structure to exchange rate shocks. A brief look at some descriptive statistics in our
database seems to suggest that currency crises modify the number of trading partners and exporting
sectors, thus affecting countries’ comparative advantage. As the reason for such an adjustment is far
from trivial, this should probably be an interesting area for future works.
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VII Appendix
1 Calibration Exercises
Figure 11: Total Exports and exchange rate movements: Calibration Exercises
Figure 11 represents the effect of exchange rate variations on total exports for different values of
σ and c. We calibrate the model for around a symmetrical equilibrium where Li = Lj = 1, and
µi = µj = 3. These calibrations are based on equation (13). Our benchmark case is characterized by
τij = 1.5, σ = 4 and cij = 1. The distribution of collateral is assumed to be Pareto, with lower bound
Ωmin = 1 and shape parameter κ, i.e. F (Ωh) = 1 − Ω
−κ
h . The choice of the Pareto distribution is
ad hoc, and the same pictures can be drawn with most common distributions. We try with different
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values of κ, i.e. we let vary the shape of the Pareto distribution. A higher κ both means a lower
mean and a higher variance of the distribution, and thus can be assimilated to a lower degree of asset
tangibility. We also let σ and cij to illustrate points (a) and (b) of proposition 3. As shown in Figure
11, the impact is non-linear for our benchmark case, and larger increases in εij have a more negative
impact on exports. High fixed costs, low asset tangibility and and high of elasticity of substitution
may reverse the reaction of total exports to exchange rate.
2 Productivity Heterogeneity and the impact of exchange rate on exports
Recent international trade theory, pioneered by Melitz (2003), has emphasized the significant role of
firms’ productivity heterogeneity in total trade adjustment. We provide in this section evidence that
in presence of financial imperfections, productivity heterogeneity may play an important role in the
aftermath of a currency depreciation. We consider a given sector, thus dropping the k subscripts for
clarity purposes.
When firms are heterogenous in terms of both collateral and productivity, their willingness to en-
ter the export market depends on their individual profits, whereas their ability of doing so will depend
on the borrowing constraints (2). We can define αij as the level of productivity such as total profit are
zero, meaning that the firm is indifferent between exporting or not to country j, i.e. operating profits
equal fixed cost. Using (8), we find:
αij =
σ
σ − 1
( σcij
φijβYj
) 1
σ−1
P−1j ε
−1
ij (20)
In a Melitz’s type model, all firms with productivity larger than (20) enter the export market. Note
that an increase in εij decreases the threshold value to enter the export market: an exchange rate
depreciation allows firms with lower productivity to be profitable enough to export, thus increasing ex-
porting probability. Denote by G(.) the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of firms’ productivity.
When financial market are complete, exports are simply given by:
Xij = βYi
∫
∞
αij
xijdG(α(h)) (21)
Using the expressions for xij and αij found previously, we find that this expression is unambiguously
increasing with εij : a currency depreciation increases demand xij , decreases the threshold αij, and
in turn increases total exports through a traditional pro-competitive effect. When financial markets
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are incomplete, only a subfraction of firms can enter the export market, i.e. those owning a collateral
larger than the thresholds given by (10). Denoting by F (.) the c.d.f. of firms’ collateral, the previous
expression becomes:
Xij = Yi
∫
∞
Ωij
∫
∞
αij
xijdG(α(h))dG(Ω(h)) =
[
1− F (
1
µi
[cijεij ])
] ∫ ∞
αij
xijdG(α(h)) (22)
Suppose that both distributions are independent. However, depending on their shapes, they may be
more or less correlated. The first term of (22) is decreasing with εij , while the second is increasing
with εij , whatever the chosen distributions G(.) and F (.). As in the previous section, total exports can
either increase or decrease after a currency depreciation, depending on the shape of productivity and
collateral distributions. Both productivity and collateral heterogeneities matter: more heterogeneity,
i.e. a larger variance of F (.) or G(.), dampens the effect of exchange rate variations, either through
the pro-competitive effect or through the balance-sheet effect. More precisely, a very concentrated
distribution of productivity (less heterogeneity) magnifies the positive impact of an exchange rate
depreciation on total exports by allowing more firms to enter the export market. On the contrary, if
the distribution of collateral is very concentrated, the balance-sheet effect, i.e. the strengthening of
borrowing constraints following an exchange rate depreciation, will be larger: more firms will exit the
export market.
In a nutshell, what matters here is not only the mean level of financial constraints (captured here
by µi and by the mean of distribution F (.)), but also the variance of their distribution: in countries
where credit constraints are very concentrated, the reaction of exports to an exchange rate depreciation
is more likely to be negative. To summarize, the overall impact of a currency depreciation depreciation
on total exports depends on the relative shapes of collateral and productivity distributions.
Illustration: Pareto Distributions. To illustrate this, let us suppose, following Chaney (2008)
or Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) among others, that productivity shocks are drawn from a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter γ. Productivity is distributed over [1,+∞) according to:
G(α(h)) = P (α˜(h) < α(h)) = 1− α(h)−γ (23)
with γ > σ − 1 (this ensure that the size distribution of firms has finite mean). Further suppose that
the distribution of collateral is also Pareto, but with shape parameter ν, and distributed over [1,+∞)
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according to:
F (Ω(h)) = P (Ω˜(h) < Ω(h)) = 1− Ω(h)−ν (24)
As before, both distributions are supposed to be independent. The Pareto parameters γ and ν are
inverse measures of heterogeneity of productivity and collateral. Under these assumptions, total
exports become:
Xij = λ1YiP
γ
j Y
σ
σ−1
j τ
−γ
ij (cij)
1− γ
σ−1 εγ+1−νij (25)
with λ1 a constant.
28 (25) is decreasing with εij when ν > γ + 1. In other words, when access to
finance is less heterogenous than productivity, firms’ exits due to the depreciation will dominate the
positive effect on firms’ entries and on export by firm, and exports will fall.
Interestingly, it is likely that credit constraints and productivity are very correlated: very produc-
tive firms may generate domestically larger profits, and thus should be more likely to invest physically,
or to own important amounts of liquidity that can serve as collateral. Here, a large and positive
correlation between both distributions, i.e. similar shapes γ and ν, may lead to a very low impact
of an exchange rate devaluation: firms’ entries, due the decrease in the productivity cut-off (20) are
dampened by firms’ exits due to the increase of the collateral threshold (10).
3 Data Appendix
28λ1 =
1
γ−(σ−1)
( σ
σ−1
)−γσ1−γ/(σ−1)
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Table 5: Currency Crises and Foreign Currency Borrowing
Country Currency Crises Banking Crises Foreign Borrowing (%)
Argentina 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 2002 1980, 1989, 2001 14.4
Bangladesh 1975 1987 5.78
Bolivia 1982, 1983, 1985 1986 2.52
Brazil 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1999 1994 3.92
Canada 1978, 1985 0 1.97
Chile 1976, 1982, 1984 1981 6.82
China 1980, 1986, 1989, 1993 1998 0.36
Colombia 1983, 1985, 1999, 2002 1982 6.11
Costa Rica 1980, 1981 1987 4.88
El Salvador 1986, 1990 1989 1.73
Ecuador 1983, 1985, 1988, 1992, 2000 1981, 1998 3.21
France 1992 0 1.56
Germany 0 0 2.15
India 1991, 1993 0 1.83
Indonesia 1978, 1983, 1986, 1997, 1998 1997 4.04
Italy 1976, 1992, 1995 0 2.36
Malaysia 1997, 1998 1985, 1998 2.58
Mexico 1976, 1982, 1994 1981, 1994 1.14
Pakistan 1979, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 0 2.91
Panama 1985, 1987, 1994 1988 6.05
Paraguay 1984, 1989, 1992 1995 3.6
Peru 1976, 1987, 1990 1983 5.54
Philippines 1983, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1997 1981, 1998 2.8
Portugal 1976, 1978, 1983 1986 0.35
Singapore 1986, 1997, 1998 1982 7.11
Spain 1976, 1982, 1992, 1993 1977 2.09
Sweden 1977, 1982, 1992 1991 0.92
Thailand 1984, 1997 1983, 1997 5.03
Turkey 1977, 1980, 1984, 1991, 1994, 2001 1982, 1994, 2000 3.31
United Kingdom 1976, 1981, 1981, 1992 0 1.02
Uruguay 1983, 2002 1981, 2002 5.15
United States 1987 0 0.98
Venezuela 1984, 1987, 1989, 1994, 1995, 2002 1980, 1993 5.42
Source: Author’s computations from IMF data for currency crises; Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) for banking crises;
authors computations from WBES (Worldbank) data for foreign borrowing. In this table are listed our results with a
broad definition of currency crises - 1.5 standard deviations above the mean of the computed exchange market pressure
index. For banking crises, the table presents systemic crises as listed by Caprio and Klingebiel.
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Table 6: Sectoral Data
ISIC Number Description Elast. of Subst. Ext. Dependence Rauch Class. Asset Tangibility
311 Food products 6,81 0,14 H 0.38
313 Beverages 2,65 0,08 R 0.28
314 Tobacco 3,73 0 R 0.22
321 Textiles 2,7 0,4 D 0.37
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 2,82 0,03 D 0.13
323 Leather products 1,82 0 D 0.09
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 2,41 0 D 0.12
331 Wood products, except furniture 2,54 0,28 D 0.38
332 Furniture, except metal 2,04 0,24 D -
341 Paper and products 3,28 0,18 R 0.56
342 Printing and publishing 2,53 0,2 D 0.30
351 Industrial chemicals 4,83 0,2 R 0.41
352 Other chemicals 1,76 0,22 D 0.20
353 Petroleum refineries 8,37 0,04 H 0.67
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 2,88 0,33 R 0.30
355 Rubber products 2,82 0,23 D 0.38
356 Plastic Products 3,54 1,14 R 0.35
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 1,34 0 D -
362 Glass and products 1,91 0,53 R 0.33
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 2,89 0,06 D 0.42
371 Iron and steel 5,03 0,09 D 0.46
372 Non-ferrous metals 3,25 0,01 H 0.38
381 Fabricated metal products 3,73 0,24 D 0.28
382 Machinery, except electrical 2,16 0,45 D 0.18
383 Machinery, electric 1,98 0,45 D 0.21
384 Transport equipment 3,63 0,31 D 0.25
385 Professional and scientific equipment 1,58 0,96 D 0.15
390 Other manufactured products 1,76 0,47 D 0.18
Sources: elasticity of substitution: Broda and Weinstein (2006). External Financial Dependence: Rajan and Zingales
(1998). Fixed costs: Rauch (1999) classification. Asset tangibility: Braun (2003).
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